Beyond EIP

spoonm & skape

BlackHat Federal, 2006

Part I

Introduction

Who are we?

- spoonm
 - Dropout bum
 - Metasploit developer since late 2003
- skape
 - Lead software developer by day
 - Independent security researcher by night
 - Joined the Metasploit project in 2004
 - Responsible for all cool features

What's this presentation about?

- What it's not about
 - New exploit / attack vectors
 - New exploitation techniques
 - 0day, bugs, etc

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 - New exploit / attack vectors
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- What it is about
 - What you can do after owning EIP
 - The techniques to do it
 - Our tools to support it

Plan of attack

- Introduction
 - Payload background
 - Technologies used as a basis
- Post-exploitation tools
 - Background & review of existing tools
 - The technology behind our tools
 - How they can be used
 - Crazy cool features for the end-user

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 - Recon, information gathering, find target
 - Initialize tools and infrastructure
 - Launch the exploit
- Post-exploitation Manipulating the target
 - Arbitrary command execution
 - Command execute via shell
 - File access, VNC, pivoting, etc
 - Advanced payload interaction

Definition

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- Data may be embedded (cmd to execute, hostname, port, etc)
- Client transmits the payload via an exploit
- Target executes the payload

Payload stagers

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 - Establish connection to attacker (reverse, portbind, findsock)
 - Read in a payload from the connection
 - Setup connection information and branch to stage
- The three steps make it so stages are independent of the connection method
 - No need to have command shell payloads for reverse, portbind, and findsock

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- Eliminate the need to re-implement payloads for each connection method
- Provides an abstraction level for loading code onto a remote machine through any medium

Existing payload stager technology

- Standard reverse, portbind, and findsock stagers included in Metasploit 2.2+
- LSD Win32 Assembly Components
- Found in public exploits (Solar Eclipse OpenSSL)

Payload stages

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- Some examples of payload stages include
 - Execute a command shell and redirect IO to the attacker
 - Execute an arbitrary command (ex adduser)
 - Download an executable from a URL and execute it

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- Not subject to size limitations of individual vulnerabilities
- This means they can be arbitrarily complex

Part II

Post Exploitation

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- Manipulation of a target begins in post-exploitation
 - Command shells are executed
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- Represents the culmination of the exploitation cycle

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- Most people spawn a command shell
 - Poor automation support
 - Reliant on the shell's intrinsic commands
 - Limited to installed applications
 - Can't provide advanced features
- Some people use syscall proxies
 - Good automation support
 - Partial or full access to target native API
 - Can be clumsy when implementing complex features
 - Typically require specialized build steps

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- Each module has a corresponding handler on client side
- Modules have a simple C ABI, and have a main function
- Most of our dN modules were written in C (shellforge)

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- Msf3 has ruby dN client side APIs
- APIs modeled after the ruby APIs (Dir, File, etc)
- Our APIs should support the majority of Ruby functionality

```
irb#1(main):001:0> c = @c
=> #<Rex::Post::DispatchNinja::Client:0xb7bf542c
   @sock=#<TCPSocket:0xb7bf5440>>
irb#1(main):002:0> c.dir.entries('/tmp')
=> [".", "..", ".X11-unix", ".ICE-unix", ".font-unix"]
irb#1(main):004:0> puts c.file.stat('/etc/passwd').pretty
  Size: 1036 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 4096 Type: 0
Device: 774 Inode: 81499 Links: 1
  Mode: 100644/rw-r--r--
  Uid: 0 Gid: 0
Access: Tue Jul 26 20:08:09 EDT 2005
Modify: Wed Jul 06 20:45:04 EDT 2005
Change: Wed Jul 06 20:45:04 EDT 2005
=> nil
irb#1(main):005:0> Process.pid
=> 1496
irb#1(main):006:0> c.process.pid
=> 1498
```

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- But before understanding Meterpreter, one should understand library injection...

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Types of library injection

- Two primary methods exist to inject a library
 - 1. **On-Disk**: loading a library from the target's harddrive or a file share
 - 2. In-Memory: loading a library entirely from memory
- Both are conceptually portable to non-Windows platforms

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- On-Disk injection is subject to filtering by Antivirus due to filesystem access
- Requires that the library file exist on the target's harddrive or that the file share be reachable

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- No disk access means no forensic trace if the machine loses power

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- Once hooked, calling LoadLibraryA with a unique pseudo file name is all that's needed

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 - Other uncommon PE features that wouldn't be supported
- No compelling reason to re-implement what is already supplied in NTDLL.DLL

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- Extremely useful when illustrating security weaknesses
- Suits understand mouse movement much better than command lines

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 - Stealthy: no disk access and no new process by default
 - **Powerful:** channelized communication and robust protocol
 - Extensible: run-time augmentation of features with extensions
- Portability also a design consideration
 - The current server implementation is only for Windows

Architecture - design goals

 Very flexible protocol; should adapt to extension requirements without modification
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- Clients on one platform should work with servers on another
- All non-critical features should be implemented by extensions

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 - Type is the packet type (request, response)
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 - Value is zero or more embedded TLVs
- TLVs make packet parsing simplistic and flexible
 - No formatting knowledge is required to parse the packet outside of the TLV structure
 - This allows a core TLV parsing engine without any knowledge of the extensions or their protocols.

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- Also includes support for migrating the server to another running process
- Metasploit 2.x has a perl Meterpreter client
- Metasploit 3.x has a ruby Meterpreter client

Augmenting features at run-time

- Adding new features is as simple as loading a DLL on the server
 - Client uploads the extension DLL
 - Server loads the DLL from memory and initializes it

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- Client can begin sending commands for the new extension

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- Feature set provides for robust client-side automation
- Designed to mirror the Ruby API to make it easy to use existing scripts against targets

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 - RPC-like protocol allows arbitrarily complex tasks to be performed with a common interface
 - Extension-based architecture makes Meterpreter completely flexible
- Use of in-memory library injection makes it possible to run in a stealth fashion

Some of the features Meterpreter can offer

- Command execution & manipulation
- Registry interaction
- File system interaction
- Network pivoting & port forwarding
- Complete native API proxying
- Anything you can do as a native DLL, Meterpreter can do!
- Sky's the limit!

Part III

Demos

Part IV

Conclusion

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- However, post-exploitation is maturing
- Metasploit 3.0 should be cool

Reference Material

Payload Stages

Library Injection

```
http://www.nologin.org/Downloads/Papers/
remote-library-injection.pdf
```

Meterpreter

http:

//www.nologin.org/Downloads/Papers/meterpreter.pdf